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Financial conditions, alternative asset management 




Developments in the ﬁ  nancial sector have led to an expansion in its ability to spread risks. The increase 
in the risk bearing capacity of economies, as well as in actual risk taking, has led to a range of ﬁ  nancial 
transactions that hitherto were not possible, and has created much greater access to ﬁ  nance for ﬁ  rms and 
households. On net, this has made the world much better off. Concurrently, however, we have also seen 
the emergence of a whole range of intermediaries, such as hedge funds, whose incentive structures can 
lead them to take more risk, especially in times of plentiful liquidity and stability. As a result, under some 
conditions, economies may be more exposed to ﬁ  nancial-sector-induced turmoil than in the past. I highlight 
concerns about the political spillovers if such instability arises.
NB: The author wishes to thank Charles Collyns and Laura Kodres  for helpful comments.ARTICLES
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S
tock markets have been scaling new heights 
recently. Risk premia and measures of risk 
aversion are at extremely low levels. With the 
equity markets anticipating strong earnings growth, 
credit markets foreseeing low defaults, and the bond 
markets expecting little inﬂ  ation, one has to ask: 
isn’t anyone pricing in risks? If not, what is going on?
In what follows, I will argue that we might be 
seeing the conﬂ  uence of two strong forces –ﬁ  rst, a 
widespread surge in productivity across the world, 
with the associated domestic demand varying country 
by country based on the strength of domestic ﬁ  nancial 
markets, and second, the increasing institutionalization 
of, and competition within, advanced ﬁ  nancial markets 
for savings. While the world has grown strongly as a 
result of both these forces in recent years, risks have 
built up and there is no guarantee that the future 
will be as rosy as the recent past. Some of the risks 
are cross-border, and ﬁ  nancial –central to the theme 
of this conference– but I will focus, not just on the 
risks to ﬁ  nancial stability, which have been widely 
discussed, but the associated political risks.1
1| THE PRODUCTIVITY
REVOLUTION
We are now in the fourth year of strong world growth, 
growth that has been maintained in the face of 
headwinds such as soaring commodities prices. In 
my view, productivity growth, fostered in part by 
the revolution in information technology, but also in 
part by the rationalization of production through the 
creation of global supply chains, has played a critical 
role in this expansion. While much attention has been 
focused on the extraordinary surge in US productivity 
since 1995, equally impressive productivity growth 
in emerging markets has been little commented 
upon. Taken together, rapid, and largely unexpected, 
worldwide productivity growth can explain why 
the demand for commodities is so strong, how 
emerging markets have weathered commodity price 
increases without a serious slowdown in investment, 
why inﬂ  ation is still largely contained despite the 
unprecedented rise in raw material costs, and why 
both household incomes and corporate proﬁ  ts are 
buoyant at the same time.
The reaction of domestic demand to rising productivity 
growth has varied across countries, in part based on 
the sophistication of their ﬁ  nancial sector. In the 
United States, for example, the surge in productivity 
led to a boom in investment in the late 1990s, ﬁ  nanced 
by deep ﬁ  nancial markets. Not all the investment was 
wise, but the debris created by the bust was quickly 
cleared by the ﬁ  nancial markets. Growth picked up 
again, though corporate investment remained subdued. 
In addition, though, the United States’ strong arm’s 
length ﬁ  nancial system allowed consumers to borrow 
against future incomes and consume immediately. 
Indeed, the expectation of higher future incomes 
coupled with accommodative monetary policy and 
low interest rates may have fueled the housing 
boom, which expanded consumption even more 
as the ﬁ  nancial system allowed borrowing through 
vehicles such as home equity loans. Also, residential 
investment compensated somewhat for the fall off 
in corporate investment. Thus the United States’ 
ﬁ  nancial system translated productivity growth into 
strong domestic demand, and a large current account 
deﬁ  cit (also see WEO September 2006).
Emerging markets countries with less sophisticated 
ﬁ   nancial systems did not have the capacity to 
reallocate resources effectively to the newly 
productive areas. Some, for example in East Asia in 
the mid 1990s, allocated resources indiscriminately, 
leading to investment booms and very severe 
busts. Experience brought more circumspection in 
investment. Others, realizing their limitations, were 
more circumspect from the outset. Regardless of the 
path, barring some notable exceptions like China, 
investment in emerging markets has been relatively 
muted in recent years (see WEO 2005) even in the 
face of strong growth. Moreover, because of the 
limited availability of housing– and retail ﬁ  nance, 
households in these countries have not been able 
to expand consumption through borrowing. Thus 
domestic demand in these countries has been 
relatively muted and these countries have generated 
net savings or current account surpluses.
1  See, for example Borio (C.) (2006): “Monetary and prudential policies at a crossroads: new challenges for a new century“, BIS working paper, White (W.) (2006): 
“Is price stability enough?”, BIS working paper, Rajan (R.) (2006) “Has ﬁ  nancial development made the world riskier?”, NBER Working Paper.ARTICLES
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2| THE SAVINGS INVESTMENT
IMBALANCE
Despite widespread strong productivity growth, 
nominal investment, especially corporate investment, 
has remained relatively weak for the world as a whole, 
while desired savings is strong. Call this a “savings 
glut” as did Chairman Bernanke or “investment 
restraint” as did the IMF, the net effect is an imbalance 
between desired savings and realized investment. 
Consequently, real long term interest rates have 
been low for some time. Interestingly, even as the 
Federal Reserve raised policy rates during 2006, long 
term interest rates fell further – in slowing domestic 
demand in the United States, markets may believe 
the Fed is aggravating the worldwide excess of desired 
savings over realized investment further.
Current conditions are unlikely to be permanent. Given 
aging populations in developed countries though, one 
would presume that the rebalancing of worldwide 
investment to desired savings will have to take place 
primarily in non-industrial countries. Investment will 
increase partly through foreign direct investment, but 
partly mediated by the ﬁ  nancial systems in emerging 
markets, which will have to develop further. Increases 
in consumption as safety nets improve, and retail 
ﬁ   nance becomes widely available will also help 
reduce desired savings. Certainly, the seemingly 
perverse pattern of net capital ﬂ  ows, from poor to rich 
countries, will have to change, if for no other reason 
than to accommodate demographics.
I now want to turn to my second issue –the increasing 
institutionalization of, and competition within, 
advanced ﬁ  nancial markets. The link between the 
issues will soon be clear. The break-up of oligopolistic 
banking systems and the rise of ﬁ  nancial markets has 
expanded individual ﬁ  nancial investment choices 
tremendously. While individuals don’t deposit a 
signiﬁ  cant portion of their savings directly in banks 
anymore, they don’t invest directly in the market 
either. They invest indirectly via mutual funds, 
insurance companies, pension funds, venture capital 
funds, hedge funds, and other forms of private equity. 
The managers of these ﬁ  nancial institutions, whom 
I shall call “investment managers”, have largely 
displaced banks and “reintermediated” themselves 
between individuals and markets.
As competition between these various institutional 
forms for the public’s investment dollar increases, 
each one attempts to assure the public that they will 
offer superior performance. But what does superior 
performance mean?
3| P ERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT
The typical manager of ﬁ  nancial assets generates 
returns based on the systematic risk he takes –
the so called beta risk– and the value his abilities 
contribute to the investment process –his so called 
alpha. Shareholders in any asset management ﬁ  rm 
are unlikely to pay the manager much for returns 
from beta risk –for example, if the shareholder 
wants exposure to large traded US stocks, she can 
get the returns associated with that risk simply by 
investing in the Vanguard S&P 500 index fund, for 
which she pays a fraction of a percent in fees. What 
the shareholder will really pay for is if the manager 
beats the S&P 500 index regularly, that is, generates 
excess returns while not taking more risk. Indeed, 
hedge fund managers often claim to produce returns 
that are uncorrelated with the traditional market (the 
so-called market neutral strategies) so that all the 
returns they generate are excess returns or alpha, 
which deserve to be well compensated.
In reality, there are only a few sources of alpha for 
investment managers. One comes from having truly 
special abilities in identifying undervalued ﬁ  nancial 
assets –Warren Buffet, the US billionaire investor, 
certainly has these, but study after academic study 
shows that very few investment managers do, and 
certainly not in a way that can be predicted before 
the fact by ordinary investors.
A second source of alpha is from what one might call 
activism. This means using ﬁ  nancial resources to 
create, or obtain control over, real assets and to use that 
control to change the payout obtained on the ﬁ  nancial 
investment. A venture capitalist who transforms an 
inventor, a garage, and an idea into a full ﬂ  edged 
proﬁ  table and professionally managed corporation is 
creating alpha. A private equity fund that undertakes 
a hostile corporate takeover, cuts inefﬁ  ciency, and 
improves proﬁ  ts is also creating alpha. So is a vulture 
investor who buys up defaulted emerging market debt ARTICLES
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and presses authorities through various legal devices 
to press the country to pay more.
A third source of alpha is ﬁ  nancial entrepreneurship 
or engineering – investing in exotic ﬁ  nancial 
securities that are not easily available to the ordinary 
investor, or creating securities or cash ﬂ  ow streams 
that appeal to particular investors or tastes. Of 
course, if enough of these securities or streams are 
created, they cease to have scarcity or diversiﬁ  cation 
value, and are valued like everything else. Thus this 
source of alpha depends on the manager constantly 
innovating and staying ahead of the competition.
Finally, alpha can also stem from liquidity provision. 
For instance, investment managers, having relatively 
easy access to ﬁ  nance, can hold illiquid or arbitrage 
positions to maturity: if a closed end fund is trading 
at a signiﬁ  cant premium to the underlying market, 
the manager can short the fund, buy the underlying 
market, and hold the position till the premium 
eventually dissipates. What is important here is that 
the investment managers have the liquidity to hold 
till the arbitrage closes. 
4| ILLIQUIDITY SEEKING
This discussion should suggest that alpha is quite hard 
to generate since most ways of doing so depend on 
the investment manager possessing unique abilities 
– to pick stock, identify weaknesses in management 
and remedy them, or undertake ﬁ  nancial innovation. 
Unique ability is rare. How then do the masses of 
investment managers justify the faith reposed in 
them by masses of ordinary investors? The answer is 
probably liquidity provision, which is the activity that 
depends least on special managerial ability and could 
be termed the poor manager’s source of alpha.
The problem when the world has excess desired 
savings relative to investment, and when central 
banks are accommodative, is that it is awash in 
liquidity. Many investment managers can enter the 
business of liquidity provision, and even as they take 
ever more illiquid positions, they compete away 
the returns from doing so. The point is that current 
benign conditions engender “illiquidity seeking” 
behavior. But they could have worse effects.
5| TAIL RISK AND HERDING
For what is the manager with relatively limited 
ability to do when central banks ﬂ  ood the market 
with liquidity and the rents from liquidity provision 
are competed away? He could hide risk – that is, 
pass off returns generated through taking on beta 
risk as alpha by hiding the extent of beta risk. Since 
additional risks will generally imply higher returns, 
managers may take risks that are typically not in 
their comparison benchmark (and hidden from 
investors) so as to generate the higher returns to 
distinguish themselves.
For example, a number of hedge funds, insurance 
companies, and pension funds have entered the credit 
derivative market to sell guarantees against a company 
defaulting. Essentially, these investment managers 
collect premia in ordinary times from people buying 
the guarantees. With very small probability, however, 
the company will default, forcing the guarantor to 
pay out a large amount. The investment managers 
are thus selling disaster insurance or, equivalently, 
taking on “peso” or “tail” risks, which produce a 
positive return most of the time as compensation for 
a rare very negative return.2 These strategies have 
the appearance of producing very high alphas (high 
returns for low risk), so managers have an incentive 
to load up on them, especially when times are good 
and disaster looks remote.3 Every once in a while, 
however, they will blow up. Since true performance 
can only be estimated over a long period, far exceeding 
the horizon set by the average manager’s incentives, 
managers will take these risks if they can.
One example of this behavior was observed in 1994, 
when a number of money market mutual funds in 
the United States came close to “breaking the buck” 
(going below a net asset value of USD 1 per share, 
which is virtually unthinkable for an ostensibly 
riskless fund). Some money market funds had to be 
bailed out by their parent companies. The reason 
they came so close to disaster was because they 
2  Peso risk is named after the strategy of investing in Mexican pesos while shorting the US dollar. This produces a steady return amounting to the interest differential 
between the two countries, although shadowed by the constant catastrophic risk of a devaluation. Another example of a strategy producing such a pattern of returns 
is to short deep out-of-the money S&P 500 put options (see Chan, Getmansky, Haas and Lo, 2005).
3  Certainly, the pattern of returns of hedge funds following ﬁ  xed income arbitrage strategies suggested they were selling disaster insurance. The worst average monthly 
return between 1990 and 1997 was a loss of 2.58 percent, but losses were 6.45 percent in September 1998 and 6.09 percent in October 1998.ARTICLES
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had been employing risky derivatives strategies 
in order to goose up returns, and these strategies 
came unstuck in the tail event caused by the Federal 
Reserve’s abrupt rate hike.
While some managers may load up on hidden “tail risk” 
to look as if they are generating alpha, others know 
that for the more observable investments or strategies 
for their portfolio, there is safety in mimicking the 
investment strategies of competitors – after all, who 
can be ﬁ  red when everybody underperforms? In 
other words, even if they suspect ﬁ  nancial assets are 
overvalued, they know their likely underperformance 
will be excused if they herd with everyone else.
Both the phenomenon of taking on tail risk and that 
of herding can reinforce each other during an asset 
price boom, when investment managers are willing 
to bear the low probability “tail” risk that asset 
prices will revert to fundamentals abruptly, and the 
knowledge that many of their peers are herding on 
this risk gives them comfort that they will not under 
perform signiﬁ  cantly if boom turns to bust.
6| RISK SEEKING
Times of plentiful liquidity not only induce investment 
managers to seek illiquidity, tail risk, as well as herd, 
since they are also times of low interest rates, they 
may induce more familiar risk seeking behavior. For 
example, when an insurance company has promised 
premium holders returns of 6 percent, while the 
typical matching long-term bond rate is 4 percent, it 
has no option if it thinks low interest rates are likely 
to persist, or if it worries about quarterly earnings, but 
to take on risk, either directly or through investments 
in alternative assets like hedge funds. Similarly, a 
pension fund that has well deﬁ   ned long dated 
obligations will have a greater incentive to boost 
returns through extra risk when risk free returns are 
low. All manner of risk premia are driven down by 
this search for yield and thus risk.
So let me summarize. We are experiencing a 
widespread phenomenon of high productivity growth, 
but low investment relative to desired savings, which 
has pushed down interest rates and pushed up asset 
prices. With plentiful liquidity, investment managers 
have reduced the premia for risk as they search for 
yield. In an attempt to generate alpha, many managers 
may be taking on beta risk, and even underpricing 
it. Of course, low interest rates and plentiful access 
to credit will, for a time, result in low default rates, 
which will appear to justify the low risk premia. The 
search for yield and for illiquidity knows no borders 
as oceans of capital spread across the globe, and asset 
prices across the globe are being pumped up. As one 
says in French, “Pourvu que ca dure!”
7| CONSEQUENCES
What could go wrong? Our hope is of a “soft” landing 
in the real sector where the factors that led to the 
current real sector imbalances reverse gently 
– for instance, domestic demand picks up in the 
non-industrial world, and growth recovers in Europe 
and Japan, even while tighter ﬁ  nancial conditions 
slow consumption in the United States. As a better 
balance between desired savings and investment 
is achieved, interest rates move up slowly, credit 
becomes less easy (aided by central bank tightening), 
and illiquidity seeking and risk seeking reverse 
gently without major blow-ups.
Of course, if any of this happens more abruptly, the 
consequences could be uglier. I will not belabor the 
possible risks to the banking system. Indeed, I do 
think the greater concern has to be about the rest of 
the ﬁ  nancial system, the 80 percent of value added 
by the ﬁ  nancial sector that is outside the banking 
system. The non-bank sector is increasingly central 
to economic activity and is not just a passive holder of 
assets. Moreover, some non-banks such as insurance 
companies and some hedge funds are subject to 
runs. But most important, risks to ﬁ  nancial stability 
are invariably compounded by political risk.
Let me explain this last concern. Finance, as 
Luigi Zingales and I have argued in our book Saving
capitalism from the capitalists, is never popular. The 
anti-ﬁ  nance constituency gains especial clout in the 
aftermath of a ﬁ  nancial crisis, and while some of the 
constraints it imposes on ﬁ  nance may be warranted, 
some like the Glass-Steagall Act, imposed in the 
United States after the Crash of 1929, are neither 
justiﬁ  ed by the evidence nor, by most counts, welfare 
enhancing.
It may well be that today’s ﬁ  nancial sector comes 
out of a future political investigation smelling like ARTICLES
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roses. But I see some ingredients that have me more 
concerned.
First, the general public’s money is being invested in 
some of the more risky ventures, a fact highlighted by 
the revelation that a number of state pension funds 
were invested in a risky hedge fund like Amaranth. 
Diversiﬁ  cation into such alternative investments can 
be a valuable component of an overall investment 
strategy if it is carefully thought out. The problem 
is that all too often, it takes place as a form of 
herding and late in the game – after lagging pension 
managers see the wonderful returns in energy, 
commodities, or from writing credit derivatives made 
by their more competent or lucky competitors, there 
is pressure on them to enter the ﬁ  eld. They do so 
late, when the good hedge- or commodity funds 
are closed to investment, and when the cycle is 
nearer peak than trough. Myriad new unseasoned 
hedge or commodity funds are started precisely to 
exploit the distorted incentives of the pension or 
insurance fund managers who queue like lemmings 
to dutifully place the public’s money. Thus far losses 
from isolated failures have been washed away in 
diversiﬁ  ed portfolios and the public has not noticed. 
Will this always continue?
Second, the fees charged by investment managers like 
hedge funds and private equity cannot but arouse envy. 
It is surprising that despite the furor over CEO pay, 
very little angst has been expressed over investment 
manager pay, even though Kaplan and Rauh (2006) 
suggest that investment manager pay growth has 
probably exceeded CEO pay growth.4 My sense is 
that there is a belief amongst the public that many 
investment managers are following sophisticated 
investment strategies –in other words, that the 
managers are generating alphas and earning returns 
for their talents– hence their pay is not questioned.
Yet investigations of collapsed funds such as Long 
Term Capital Management (LTCM) don’t seem to 
indicate terribly sophisticated strategies –indeed 
more beta than alpha. While there is a selection 
bias in examining failed funds –they are likely to 
have more beta– it is also likely that large funds with 
unsophisticated strategies got to that size through a 
series of lucky bets that paid off. So their managers 
will have taken home enormous sums of money 
before it is realized that they had simply been 
gambling with other people’s money. Large losses, 
“greedy” managers, and an angry public– this is a 
perfect scenario for a muck-raking politician to build 
a career on. The regulatory impediments that could 
be imposed on the investment managers who add 
value, and on the ﬁ  nancial sector as a whole, could 
be debilitating.
Third, and accentuating the political problem, is that 
while it is clear to the public how a bank making a 
loan beneﬁ  ts the real economy or “Main Street”, it 
is less clear to it how an investment manager who 
spreads and allocates risk, improves governance, 
or reveals information through his trading, helps. 
We economists know these are very important 
functions in the economy but they are not so easily 
sold politically.
And ﬁ  nally, since capital has spread across borders, 
any sudden future retrenchment could not only 
inﬂ  ict pain on recipient countries but also generate 
foreign political pressure seeking to impede the free 
ﬂ  ow of capital.
The last few years have been, in many ways, the 
best of times for the world economy. The ﬁ  nancial 
sector has contributed immensely. However, the 
current conjuncture has led to some practices that 
deserve examination. In particular, I worry whether 
compensation structures give too much incentive to 
take risk and, relatedly, whether pay is sufﬁ  ciently 
linked to performance. Much of the debate has 
been over whether these are systemic concerns. My 
point today is that even if the consequences are not 
collectively important enough to stress enormous 
economies like those of the United States or the 
Euro area, if questionable practices are numerous 
enough, they could stress the political system, 
which then may react in a way that has systemic 
consequences. To avoid the risk of possibly excessive 
political reaction, it is important that the issues 
that I have just alluded to be discussed by the 
ﬁ  nancial sector itself, and where necessary, and 
possible, adjustments made. It would be a shame 
if sparks from the red-hot ﬁ  nancial sector set off 
a conﬂ  agration that destroyed the very real gains 
ﬁ  nance has made in the last few decades. Indeed, 
history suggests abundant caution.
4  Kaplan (S.) and Rauh (J.) (2006): “Wall Street and Main Street: what contributes to the rise in the highest incomes?”, Working Paper, University of Chicago.